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Foreword
The past has a funny habit of repeating itself. As the 
third industrial revolution took hold in the 1970s, 
we expected to see a dramatic improvement in 
productivity. But, as the US economist Robert 
Solow quipped at the time: you see the computer 
age everywhere but in the productivity statistics. 
Of course, it can take years for economic benefits 
to become apparent. Yet, as the fourth industrial 
revolution starts to take off now, we face a similar 
paradox. Productivity remains a significant 
challenge to Scotland and the UK as a whole, with 
the Office for Budget Responsibility last month 
downgrading its forecasts for the next four years.
Combined with ongoing economic fragility, 
political uncertainty, and an aging workforce, its 
evident that this weeks Scottish Budget comes 
at a profoundly important time for Scotland  a 
fact reflected throughout this latest Economic 
Commentary from the Fraser of Allander Institute. 
The question is, what can the Scottish Government 
do to help solve the productivity conundrum and 
help the economy to grow? 
Investment in technology, education, skills, and 
infrastructure are good places to start. 
The Edinburgh City Region Deal, announced earlier 
this year, was a major step in the right direction. 
Within the £1.1 billion package are pledges to 
create one of the worlds leading data innovation 
centres, train 100,000 data scientists, as well as 
set up a regional skills development programme  
all of which should help boost productivity.
We may also see more initiatives such as the 
Scottish Governments launch of a £4 million fund 
to attract the worlds brightest entrepreneurs to 
Scotland and help them develop their ideas for 
businesses. 
This should add to the sense of confidence 
and purpose we saw from our community of 
entrepreneurs at this years Entrepreneurial 
Scotland Awards in November, an event Deloitte 
were proud to sponsor once again. 
More initiatives like these are likely to follow in the 
years ahead. But, whatever happens, the Scottish 
Government has the task of setting the right 
balance of policies which can tackle the challenges 
we face. Unlike Solows witticism suggests, looking 
beyond the immediate horizon is likely to be part 
of the answer. 
John Macintosh 
Tax Partner
Deloitte
 December 2017
Long-term thinking could be key to Scotlands productivity challenge
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This weeks Scottish Budget (14.12.17) comes at a 
crucial time for Scotlands economy. 
With Brexit uncertainty continuing to cast a shadow, 
plus a gloomier outlook for UK productivity, the 
Budget provides an important opportunity for the 
Scottish Government to set out their plans to support 
the Scottish economy. 
The Budget will also mark the first time that 
we will have forecasts from the new Scottish 
Fiscal Commission (SFC). The SFC will provide an 
independent assessment of the outlook for the 
economy, devolved taxes and social security. 
They will do so against a backdrop of ongoing 
economic fragility. Growth in Scotland slowed 
to just 0.1% over the 3-months to June. Over the 
year, growth has been around 1/3 that of the UK. 
In contrast, employment continues to be close to a 
record high  at least since the Labour Force Survey 
started in 1992. The downside has been further falls 
in productivity. 
The latest leading indicators suggest that the 
economy is continuing to grow, albeit at a relatively 
slow pace. The Scottish FAI/RBS Scottish Business 
Monitor for Q3 2017 showed both a rise in business 
and new orders. Our latest survey of activity in the oil 
and gas sector shows a further pick-up in optimism, 
although conditions remain challenging. 
With this backdrop, it is vital that the Budget sets out 
a clear vision for how the government will help take 
advantage of the significant economic opportunities 
we know will exist in the future  whether that 
is boosting entrepreneurship and innovation, 
supporting the development and use of new 
technologies or tapping in to growing international 
markets. 
Summary
With economic uncertainty likely to remain a dominant 
feature for the foreseeable future, focussing on where 
government can make a difference in the long-term is 
vital. 
But with the Scottish block grant for day-to-day 
spending falling in real-terms over the next two years 
(at least), and the Scottish Fiscal Commission likely to 
forecast weaker devolved tax revenues than had been 
expected this time last year, the Finance Secretary 
will be forced to take some big decisions, not just on 
how to balance the budget and support growth, but 
to deliver on key manifesto commitments. The likely 
squeeze on unprotected budgets  such as non-ring 
fenced local government  looks stark. The outlook 
for capital is much healthier. And the near £1bn of 
financial transactions announced in the Autumn 
Budget provides an opportunity to be innovative. 
On balance, the combination of over two years of 
weak growth, a projected decline in Scotlands 
working age population, and ongoing challenges in 
the oil and gas sector, mean that Scotland will do 
well to match UK growth over the next few years. 
That being said, we forecast that the Scottish 
economy will continue to grow over our forecast 
period (2018, 2019 and 2020). Our latest forecasts 
are for growth of 1.2% in 2018, 1.4% in 2019 and 
1.4% in 2020.
How this weak outlook will impact on the Scottish 
budget depends, in part, on how the key determinants 
of income tax  employment and wages  are affected 
in the short-run. 
It is not inconceivable that weaker revenue forecasts 
from the Scottish Fiscal Commission could offset, at 
least in part, some of any tax hike proposed by the 
Scottish Government. 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
December 2017
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FAI forecast: Scottish GVA growth and by sector 
2018 2019 2020
GVA 1.2 1.4 1.4
Production 1.4 1.6 1.2
Construction 0.7 0.9 0.5
Services 1.2 1.4 1.5
FAI forecast: Scottish GVA growth 
Growth set to continue to 2020 but to remain fragile and below trend Growth to rise to 1.4% in 2019 but forecasts revised down from Sept
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Outlook and Appraisal 
Decembers Scottish Budget comes at a crucial time. Growth remains below trend and Brexit continues to 
create uncertainty. The political focus will no doubt be on any proposed changes to income tax. But with 
rising demand for public services and tight resources a wider debate is needed about the sustainability of 
key spending priorities and how to boost economic growth in Scotland.  
Introduction
The Scottish economy grew by just 0.1% in the 
second quarter of 2017. Annual growth has risen 
to 0.5%, but is still well below trend and a third of 
the rate in the UK. (Chart 1)
Conditions remain challenging, but most surveys 
point to growth  albeit modest  next year.  
In contrast, the labour market continues to hold 
up well, with employment close to a record high. 
(Table 1) 
However with limited growth in the wider economy, 
Scottish productivity has slipped. Output per hour 
 the key measure of labour productivity  is down
by around 4% since 2015. (Chart 2)
Weak productivity has been a feature of the UK 
economy since the financial crisis. 
The UK Governments Industrial Strategy is an 
attempt to tackle this with targeted industry support 
and investment in R&D and new technologies. 
The Scottish Government has an opportunity to 
set out its vision for the economy in the Budget. 
Following a speech in August when the First 
Minister signalled a new approach, businesses 
will be looking carefully at the detail of the Budget, 
particularly if  as now seems certain  taxes will 
increase for many. 
With devolved finances continuing to be squeezed 
and expensive manifesto commitments to be paid 
for in health and education, one-year sticking 
plasters in the form of tax rises can only help for so 
long. A strategy for managing demand, prioritising 
where money is spent and growing the economy is 
now needed more than ever.
Chart 1: Scottish economic growth (%), since 2013
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP
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Table 1: UK labour market rates, July-September 2017
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey (Nov 17)
Employment
(16-64)
Unemployment
(16+)
Inactivity
(16-64)
Scotland 75.2 4.0 21.6
England 75.4 4.3 21.2
Wales 72.5 4.1 24.2
N. Ire 68.1 4.0 28.9
UK 75.0 4.3 21.6
Chart 2: Scottish productivity since 1998 trend vs. outturn
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 Productivity
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The global economy
This time last year, the outlook for the global 
economy was very different. 
The Euro Area was struggling and there were fears 
for the stability of some emerging economies 
 including China. At the same time, the UK was
confounding expectations of a post-EU referendum 
slowdown and was on track to be one of the fastest 
growing economies in the G7.  
Fast forward and we now have a weaker UK economy 
with higher inflation and lower growth. (Chart 3). 
In contrast, global growth is projected to be over 
3.5% this year, rising to 3.75% in 2018  the fastest 
rate since 2010. (Table 2). 
Europe is more buoyant, with confidence at its 
highest since the financial crisis. (Chart 4)
Two points are worth reflecting upon.
Firstly, it can be easy for the short-term outlook 
to dominate debates and day-to-day activities. 
No matter the immediate outlook, for businesses, 
focussing on the long-term and strategies for value 
and growth is key.  
Secondly, there are opportunities for Scotland to 
tap into renewed global optimism (particularly in 
emerging economies). We currently export 60% 
more to Ireland than we do to China and as much 
to Luxembourg as to India  so there is scope to do 
much better. (Chart 5)
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
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Table 2: OECD forecasts for G7 Growth: 2016 (outturn) to 2019
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
2016 2017 2018 2019
UK 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.1
US 1.5 2.2 2.5 2.1
Japan 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.0
Canada 1.5 3.0 2.1 1.9
Euro Area 1.8 2.4 2.1 1.9
Germany 1.9 2.5 2.3 1.9
France 1.1 1.8 1.8 1.7
Italy 1.1 1.6 1.5 1.3
Chart 3: Latest IMF forecasts compared to those made in April 
2016  change in outlook for growth and inflation 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook
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Chart 4: Rising consumer confidence in Europe  in contrast to 
the UK where the outlook has turned gloomier Chart 5: Emerging markets to drive growth over next few years  
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Developing new markets is crucial, particularly 
when UK domestic demand is weak and Brexit 
poses a challenge to established trade links. 
Leaving the EU undoubtedly represents the 
greatest change for our economy in a generation. 
Alongside trade relations, it will undoubtedly have 
an impact on sources of future investment and 
the supply of workers. At the same time, future 
economic and financial policy could look quite 
different. 
There remains significant uncertainty about the 
costs and benefits of Brexit. Much will depend 
upon how policymakers react, both within and 
outwith the UK. 
Key points of policy to be agreed include:  
1. The terms of (Br)exit
2. The transition to any new arrangement
3. The long-term economic, political and social
relationship between the UK and the EU
Significant progress has been made on part 1 - 
with a deal on finances, EU citizens and the Irish 
border. However, the scale of the task in ensuring 
a smooth exit from the EU remains challenging.   
For example, around 135,000 jobs in Scotland are 
estimated to be supported by demand from EU 
exports, both directly and through the spill-over 
effects into the wider economy. (Table 3)
Careful prioritisation of sector needs will be 
important in any trade deal. The priorities for 
Scotland and the UK may not necessarily align 
 with many of the most important sectors for
Scotland less significant at the UK level. (Table 4)
As always, the outlook for Scotland will depend, in 
part, upon the outlook for global oil prices. 
The latest FAI assessment of the industry suggests 
that optimism continues to recover. (Chart 6).  
This reflects, in part, the action taken to reduce 
costs, improve production efficiency and diversify 
to help support long-term sustainability.
Chart 6: Latest FAI/AGCC Oil and Gas Survey: Autumn 2017  
rising optimism  amongst firms in the UKCS
Source:  FAI - AGCC 27 Oil and Gas Survey
Table 3: Scottish employment supported by external demand, 
2014 Q3 2016 to Q2 2017
Source: HMRC Regional Trade Statistics
Scotland UK
Growth Sector EU rank
% of sector 
exports
EU rank
Petroleum & related 1 67.5% 2
Beverages 2 31.1% 20
Fish & crustaceans 3 77.4% 30
General machinery 4 34.2% 6
Electronic machinery 5 51.7% 7
Miscellaneous goods 6 63.4% 4
Chemicals and products 7 83.3% 17
Gas, natural & 
manufactured
8 83.3% 21
Power generating 
machinery 
9 13.9% 8
Medicinal & pharma 10 53.0% 5
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Table 4: Top 10 Scottish goods exports to EU  by value and rank 
Source: Fraser of Allander
EU exports Non-EU exports rUK exports
Direct 80,300 115,500 337,300
Indirect 33,000 49,700 144,200
Induced 21,100 30,500 82,700
Total 134,400 195,700 564,200
9Economic Commentary, December 2017
The price of oil has risen steadily over the past six 
months  helping to support profitability across 
the oil and gas sector. (Chart 7).
This has been helped by sharp reductions in costs. 
The UK Oil and Gas Authority estimate that average 
unit costs in the North Sea have fallen by a third 
from £18 per barrel in 2014 to £12 per barrel in 
2016. 
For Scotlands wider economy this is a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, ensuring 
the sustainability of the oil and gas sector is clearly 
a positive, but in the short-term, these reductions 
in spend  including on wages and salaries  are 
having a major impact on the economy of the North 
East. 
Looking forward, the outlook for investment 
 whilst more positive than 12 months ago 
continues to remain weak. Only eight appraisal
wells were spudded in 2016 (the lowest since
1971) and overall investment is down nearly 50%
on 2014 levels. (Chart 8).
The Chancellors announcement in the Budget 
on historical tax reliefs provides a further new 
initiative to try and help prolong the longevity of 
the sector. 
The UK economy
Overall UK growth has slowed in 2017, with annual 
growth of just 1.5% (below trend of >2%). 
That being said, quarterly growth picked up over 
the summer (Jul  Sep) to 0.4%. This was faster 
than the 0.3% growth recorded in each quarter of 
the first half of the year. (Chart 9).
Back in March, the OBR predicted growth of 2.0% 
in 2017. Short of a much larger than expected 
pick-up in Q4  close to 0.8%  this is now unlikely. 
The OBRs latest forecast is for growth of just 1.5% 
in 2017. 
A key driver of this slower growth has been weaker 
construction sector output (which had been a 
strong driver of growth since 2013) and higher 
than anticipated inflation weakening consumer 
demand. (Chart 10).
Chart 7: Oil prices to remain subdued: providing stability for the 
North Sea but limited scope for investment
Source: IMF, Thomson Reuters Datastream 
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Chart 8: Expenditure on UKCS North Sea (2006 to 2016): sharp 
fall in capital investment and operating costs
Source: ONS, Preliminary Q3 GDP 
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Chart 9: UK economic growth  upturn in Q3 but growth still 
below trend and annual growth slowing over the year
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As Chart 11 highlights, consumer spending had 
been the key driver of growth in 2015 and 2016. 
NB: The volatility between Gross Capital Formation 
and net trade reflects a technical issue regarding 
the trading of precious metals on the London 
Bullion market. The UKs non-gold trade position 
was broadly constant over this period.
The slowdown in consumer spending during 2017 
reflects the ongoing squeeze on real wages and 
household budgets. (Chart 12)
After recovering during 2015 and 2016, the fall in 
the pound and spike in import prices has meant 
that real earnings are falling once more. 
The IFS believe that average real earnings are on 
course to be £1,400 a year lower in 2021 than was 
forecast in 2016. They also believe that it will be 
well into the next decade before earnings return to 
their pre-financial crisis levels.  
CPI inflation is now 3%. Within that, food and 
non-alcoholic drink inflation is now 4.1%, the 
highest since 2013. This alongside rising fuel and 
transport costs are driving the increase in overall 
inflation. (Chart 13)
Such increases are all the more challenging for 
those on lower incomes as such purchases make 
up a larger proportion of day-to-day spending. 
The expectation is that price pressures will start to 
ease in the months ahead, although  even with 
the recent increase in interest rates  inflation is 
on track to be above target for the next 3 years. 
Chart 10: Economic performance of broad sectors of UK 
economy since 2012 
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream
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Chart 11: Components of UK growth since 2015  private 
consumption remains the consistent net driver
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream
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Chart 12: UK regular average weekly earnings growth: 3-month 
on a year ago 
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream
Chart 13: Drivers of UK CPI inflation
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream
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Despite these pressures, current indicators of 
day-to-day economic activity continue to show 
resilience. 
The closely watched UK Purchasing Managers 
Index (PMI) for services, manufacturing and 
construction, all show businesses reporting 
growth. As with the official statistics, construction 
is the weakest. (Chart 14)
In contrast however, measures of underlying 
confidence amongst businesses remains fragile. 
The latest CBI confidence indicators have once 
again turned negative  reflecting current 
perceptions of the Brexit negotiations. (Chart 15)
The ZEW Economic Sentiment Index for the UK also 
declined further in December. 
This suggests that whilst businesses are getting 
on with the job, they remain nervous about the 
outlook. If this fragility in confidence was to take 
a further blow, then it may not take much for it to 
have an impact on the real economy. 
One area where weak confidence is showing up 
in terms of actual activity is investment. Business 
investment has been treading water in the UK for 
the best part of two years. (Chart 16)
This is clearly a concern as investment is believed 
to be one of the most important drivers of long-term 
productivity and competitiveness. 
Some of the weakness in investment will 
undoubtedly reflect Brexit-driven uncertainties 
weighing on confidence. 
But it also appears to be part of a longer-term 
trend. Tackling this track record of weak private 
sector investment  remember investment in the 
UK has been lower than in many other countries for 
a number of years  will be crucial. 
This is one motivation behind the UK Governments 
industrial strategy and the Scottish Governments 
plans for a National Investment Bank. 
Chart 14: Latest UK PMI still shows underlying resilience in 
economy despite uncertainty (>50 marks expansion) 
Source: IHS Markit
Chart 15: CBI measures of confidence  show heightened 
nervousness amongst firms large and small
Source: CBI, Thomson Reuters Datastream
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Chart 16: Official statistics show sustained weak business 
investment in the UK for over 2 years
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream 
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This low level of investment  coupled with a tight 
labour market  has led policymakers (including 
the Bank of England), to believe that even modest 
growth will erode the remaining spare capacity in 
the economy. If this was to happen, the pressure 
on inflation will become even more acute. 
For example despite recent weak rates of growth, 
UK manufacturing is operating at its highest level 
of capacity utilisation since 2007. (Chart 17) 
We can see similar constraints in the labour 
market. Chart 18 shows a range of measures of 
labour capacity. Data to the left of the vertical axis 
(negative points relative to the mean) indicate 
lower-than-average spare capacity (and vice versa). 
As the chart highlights, most measures of spare 
capacity point to labour market tightening over 
the year. Whilst some indicators  e.g. the number 
of part-time workers  suggest that there remains 
some capacity that could be called on, capacity 
constraints are clearly beginning to bite.
Most economists believe that the UK is close 
to operating at, or above, capacity. This is 
demonstrated by the near zero output gap  the 
difference between actual and potential output  
forecast by the OBR and others.  (Chart 19)
It is the potential for this to lead to higher inflation, 
coupled with rising indebtedness, that lay behind 
the Bank of Englands decision to increase interest 
rates (and signal a rise to 1% by 2020) (Chart 20)
Chart 17: Capacity utilisation (%) in UK manufacturing sector 
reaches post-financial crisis high 
Source: EuroStat Thomson Reuters Datastream
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Chart 18: Measures of spare capacity in the UK labour market, 
relative to 2002 to 2007 average
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility
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Chart 19: Output gap  actual vs. potential output  is estimated 
to have closed with UK economy near capacity
Source: ONS, LFS 
Chart 20: Projected path for interest rates  first increase since 
financial crisis (but planned increases remain small)
Source: Bank of England
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The UK economic outlook
Operating at close to  or above  capacity would 
normally suggest that the UK economy was in good 
health. 
In contrast, most forecasts predict weak growth 
over the next few years. 
The OBRs forecasts are for growth of just 1.4% 
and 1.3% for 2018 and 2019 respectively. (Chart 
21). Indeed the OBR has wiped off £60bn from 
their UK GDP forecasts for the next 5 years since 
their previous forecast in March. 
Whilst the OBR are slightly more downbeat than 
the Bank of England, most independent forecasters 
share the view that (even assuming a smooth 
Brexit), UK growth will be fragile over the next few 
years. (Table 5)
Weaker growth across the board is predicted with 
consumption particularly constrained relative to 
historical levels in 2018 and 2019. (Chart 22)
The key driver of these downbeat forecasts is the 
UKs much weaker outlook for productivity. 
In recent years, UK productivity growth has been 
much lower than prior to the financial crisis. 
This puzzle was largely seen as a temporary 
phenomenon but the OBR have revised this 
assessment and now believe it to be something 
more long-term. (Chart 23)
Chart 21: Evolution of OBR forecasts over last 12 months
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility
Table 5: UK forecasts for GDP and inflation from major 
independent forecasters
Source: Various
Chart 22: Composition of OBR UK growth forecasts to 2022 
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility 
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Chart 23: Weak UK productivity has been a feature since 2008: 
OBR now expect impact to be long-term
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility 
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Huge uncertainty exists over the outlook for 
productivity across advanced economies. Some 
economists are pessimistic, believing that we have 
entered an era of weak productivity growth.  
It is hard however, to reconcile this with the 
opportunities that exist from automation and the 
growth of the digital economy. 
As always, the reality is likely to lie somewhere 
in-between. Legacy effects from the financial 
crisis (e.g. a mis-functioning banking system) and 
a cycle of labour hoarding and weak investment, 
are all still likely to be having some impact and 
should recede over time. 
That being said, it is clear that the UK faces a 
considerable long-term productivity challenge. 
More needs to be done  not just to grow high 
productivity sectors but  to turn around the 
long-tail of less productive firms and sectors that 
make up a large proportion of the UK economy. 
(Chart 24) 
Improving levels of investment, R&D, skills and 
innovation are important. But so is boosting 
business efficiency, like better management and 
process innovation. The Bank of England estimates 
that a third of UK companies have seen no growth 
in productivity this century.  
The UK Autumn Budget
This gloomier outlook has  once again  led 
the OBR to revise up its public sector borrowing 
forecasts. 
Despite this years borrowing being lower than 
expected, the OBR now predict higher borrowing 
across the forecast horizon. (Chart 25)
Even before the measures announced in the Budget, 
the UK Government was expected to borrow over 
£30bn more by 2021-22 than it planned back in 
March. Recall that this comes on the back of an 
additional £100bn of borrowing added this time 
last year. The reason for this failure to make inroads 
in the deficit has been the weak performance of 
tax revenues in recent years. (Chart 26)  
Chart 24: UK productivity by industry (over year 2016/17): 
substantial variation in productivity by industry  long-tail 
Source: ONS, UK productivity series
Chart 25: Revised UK public sector borrowing  with date for end 
of austerity pushed back 
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, FAI calculations
Chart 26: Fiscal outturns compared to 2010 plans  spending on 
track to meet target but revenues weak 
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, FAI calculations
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UK public sector net debt is forecast to stabilise at 
around 80% of GDP. (Chart 27)
It is the levels of indebtedness that the Chancellor is 
arguably most interested in both from an economic 
and political perspective. 
Despite UK debt to GDP doubling since the financial 
crisis, the cost of servicing these debt obligations 
has remained broadly constant in real terms. This is 
because although the stock of debt has increased, 
the interest rates on gilts has fallen to near record 
low levels.
But should the outlook for government borrowing 
charges change, either because interest rates rise 
to combat inflation or investors become nervous 
about the UKs prospects outside the EU, then the 
costs of servicing the debt will rise.
The UK Budgets implications for 
Scotland
The UK Budget contained a number of measures 
with implications for Scotland  including further 
tax breaks for the North Sea. 
There were also Barnett consequentials of £2bn 
over the period 2017-18 to 2020-21. £1.6bn  or 
just over 80%  was in the form of capital spending. 
(Chart 28)
Resource spending is expenditure which covers 
day-to-day services on things like pay and resources 
for schools and hospitals. This was boosted by 
around £350m over 2017-18 to 2019-20.
However, the Scottish Governments resource 
block grant remains on track to fall in real terms 
over the course of this parliament. (Chart 29)
This will take spending back to near 2006-07 
levels. It should be noted though that Scotlands 
population has grown since then, making the 
relative squeeze that bit more intense. (Chart 30) 
The outlook for capital spending is more positive. 
(Chart 31)
Chart 27: UK public sector net debt close to 80% of GDP 
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility
Chart 28: Barnett Consequentials for Scottish Budget from 
Autumn Budget: 2017/18 to 2020/21 (cash terms) 
Source: FAI calculations
Chart 29: SG Resource budget to fall (in real terms) by over 
£350m between 2016-17 and 2019-20 - even after series of 
increases in recent budgets
Source: FAI calculations
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Of the £1.6bn capital uplift, the majority of this 
was in financial transactions  of around £1.1bn. 
Financial transactions are becomingly increasingly 
common. Whilst they cannot be used to support 
day-to-day spending or to fund traditional capital 
building programmes, they support new investment 
through the provision of government-backed loans 
and equity to the private sector.
Whilst it is true that financial transactions are 
different to traditional public sector spending, 
if used wisely they are an important instrument 
available to government. Indeed the Scottish 
Government has made extensive use of them in 
the past  e.g. via help to buy initiatives.   
One area the government may find them particularly 
helpful is to consider how they might be used to 
support the creation of the Scottish Governments 
proposed Scottish National Investment Bank. 
Even excluding financial transactions, the Scottish 
Governments traditional capital budget is on 
track to increase 6% in 2018/19. And the Scottish 
Government can now also borrow to support further 
capital investment. Use of these borrowing powers 
in full in 2018/19 could take capital spending 
back to levels not seen since the historic high of 
2010/11. 
Taken altogether, the Scottish Governments total 
block grant (resource and capital but excluding 
financial transactions) is on track to increase by 
around 1% between 2016-17 and 2019-20.   
Recent Scottish Economy Data
The latest figures show growth in the Scottish 
economy of just 0.1% for the 3-months to July. 
The downturn was driven by another sharp fall 
in construction sector activity. In contrast, the 
all-important services sector had relatively robust 
growth. 
Such weak overall results are hugely disappointing. 
(Chart 32)
Chart 30: SG resource block grant since 1999 - taking spending 
back to around 2006-07 levels
Source: FAI calculations
Chart 31: SG capital block grant to 2020-21: outlook more 
positive than resource and soon above 2010-11 levels 
Source: FAI calculations
Chart 32: Scottish GDP growth Q2 2017 by broad sector
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP 
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The results for Q2 came on the back of strong 
growth for the first three months of 2017 (initially 
+0.8% but now revised to +0.6%)
When the Q1 results were first posted in July, this 
led some to argue that the economy was in more 
robust health than we  and others  believed to 
be the case. 
But as we have pointed out, much of the bounce-back 
was driven by temporary factors concentrated in a 
small number of sectors. Just three industries in 
manufacturing  with a combined value of just 6% 
of the Scottish economy  contributed around half 
the net growth during Q1. (Chart 33)
It was a near certainty therefore, that growth would 
slip back in the subsequent quarter.  
As we have said on a number of occasions, it 
is important not to get too carried away with 
one quarters set of results (be they positive or 
negative). 
The Scottish series can be volatile, so focussing 
on longer-term trends is more relevant. And on this 
basis, there is no escaping that Scottish growth 
has been weak. In five of the past six quarters, 
Scottish growth has been just 0.1% or lower and 
GDP per capita has been broadly flat since 2015. 
(Chart 34)
One bright-spot in the most recent quarterly results 
is the strong growth in services  with growth of 
0.7% over the 3-month period to June. 
In most instances, strong growth in services would 
be sufficient to power faster growth given that it 
accounts for 75% of the Scottish economy.
But this was offset by declining activity in the 
construction sector  for the sixth consecutive 
quarter  and activity in the production sector 
slipping back.
As Chart 35 highlights, over the past two years, 
both production and construction have dragged 
down overall growth in the Scottish economy. 
Chart 33: Performance of three sectors (and manufacturing) 
which drove growth in Q1 2017
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP 
Chart 34: Scottish GDP per head vs. UK from 2015 
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP 
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Chart 35: Contribution to growth  last 10, 5 and 2 years  
construction and production lagging but services strong
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Since 2007 Q2 Since 2012 Q2 Since 2015 Q2
Agriculture Forestry & Fishing Production Construction Services GDP growth (%)
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
2015 2016 2017
2
0
1
5
 Q
1
 =
 1
0
0
Manufacturing
Refined Petroleum, Chemicals and Pharma
Metals & machinery
Other manufacturing
18 Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 37: Scottish & UK economic performance: Q1 2007 to Q2 
2017
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP 
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Over the course of the year, the Scottish economy 
has grown 0.5% - around a quarter of trend growth. 
Unfortunately, this is part of an increasingly 
consistent story.
Like many other advanced economies, the Scottish 
economy has been stuck in a cycle of relatively 
weak growth. 
Between 1999 and 2006, reported growth in GDP 
per head averaged 2.3% per annum. After the 
financial crisis of 2007  2009, annual reported 
growth has averaged just 0.8%. (Chart 36)
The Scottish Parliaments Economy, Jobs and Fair 
Work Committee has launched an inquiry into 
Scotlands economic performance since 2007.
On many key indicators, such as productivity, 
participation and economic inequality, limited 
progress has been made in closing the gap with 
the top performing countries. 
For example back in 2007, the Scottish Government 
set a target to close the growth gap with the UK by 
2011. But in the 42 quarters since the start of 2007, 
the annual growth differential between Scotland 
and the UK has only been in Scotlands favour on 
12 occasions. (Chart 37).
The growth gap with the UK over time is narrower 
when looking at GDP per head. Much faster 
population growth at the UK level has been a key 
reason why overall UK growth has been stronger. 
It is possible to examine the key components of 
growth over time. (Table 6)
Taking the latest decade we have full data for  
2006 to 2016  productivity grew at a faster rate in 
Scotland than in the UK as a whole . 
In contrast, for both population and key 
labour market indicators, the UK economy has 
out-performed Scotland. Table 6: Key growth drivers over last decade: average % change
Source: FAI calculations
Chart 36: Annual Scottish GDP per head growth: 1999 to 2016
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP 
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
%
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 G
D
P
 p
e
r 
h
e
a
d
 (
a
n
n
u
a
l)
1999 to 2006 average: 2.3%
2010 to 2016 average: 0.8%
Average Annual Growth Rates  
(2006 - 2016)
Scotland UK
Productivity 0.69 0.22
Participation -0.24 -0.01
Working age population 0.35 0.65
Average hours worked -0.10 0.01
19Economic Commentary, December 2017
Drivers of growth
With the exception of gross fixed capital formation  
i.e. investment  the core expenditure components 
of GDP increased in cash terms over the second 
quarter of 2017. 
Private consumption was again the main 
contributor  as it has been since 2015. (Chart 38)
Net trade made a positive contribution for the 
second quarter. Whilst this is a modelled series, 
and should be viewed with caution, this appears to 
be driven by two factors. 
Firstly, an improvement in the international trade 
balance. Secondly, activity in Scotland which 
supports the North Sea  i.e. the supply chain such 
as engineering and services for offshore workers 
 is (oddly in our view) counted as a rUK export.
As the downturn has eased so our notional trade
position with rUK has improved. (Chart 39)
Like the UK, consumption growth has eased 
in recent times. This is unsurprising given the 
squeeze on household incomes. 
Consumers have been compensating for weak 
growth in employee income by lowering their 
savings. (Chart 40) The savings ratio has fallen 
further in 2017  from 11% in 2015 to 6.4% now.  
At the same time, the amount of unsecured 
borrowing has increased. (Chart 41)
Chart 38: Expenditure components of GDP since 2015  
households remain most important factor 
Source: Scottish Government, Quarterly National Accounts
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Chart 39: Ongoing challenges with Scottish exports  though 
estimated trade deficit has narrowed 
Source: Scottish Government, Quarterly National Accounts
Chart 40: Employee income and the savings ratio downturn in 
income coincides with fall in savings
Source: Scottish Government, Quarterly National Accounts
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The fall in capital formation was once again driven 
by weak levels of business investment. 
As Chart 42 highlights, business investment has 
fallen by 14.8% over the year and by nearly 25% 
in two years. 
Note too, that the figures are in current prices (i.e. 
unadjusted for inflation), so in reality the scale of 
the weakness in investment is even starker. 
How does this square with recent statistics which 
showed that the number of businesses in Scotland 
was at a record high? As at March 2017, there were 
an estimated 365,600 private sector enterprises - 
an increase of 3.1% on 2016.  
But 78% of the increase was in unregistered 
businesses, with a further 19% registered but 
having no employees. Unregistered firms tend to 
be small (primarily self-employed).
As Chart 43 highlights this is part of a longer-term 
trend, with a sharp increase in un-registered firms.
It would appear that much of the recent pick-up in 
business activity has not been in more traditional 
forms of business, but in self-employment and 
employees setting themselves up as consultants.
Since 2010 nearly 80% of the net growth in firms 
with 0-49 employees has been in the professional, 
administrative and information sectors  where 
consultancy growth has been high. (Chart 44).
It is also interesting that the vast majority of the 
growth in larger businesses since 2010 (50+ 
employees)  has been in firms owned outwith 
Scotland. (Table 7)
Chart 42: Business investment in Scotland since 2008  very 
little growth even in cash terms 
Source: Scottish Government, Quarterly National Accounts
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Chart 43: Significant growth in new businesses in Scotland 
since 2000  but most are small
Source: Businesses in Scotland, FAI calculations
Chart 44: Growth in small businesses (<50 employees) since 
2010  composition of growth by sector 
Source: Businesses in Scotland, FAI calculations
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Table 7: Sources of business growth by origin: 2010 to 2017
Source: Businesses in Scotland, FAI calculations
Enterprises Jobs
Growth
% of total 
growth
Scottish owned
0-49 + 20,865 99% +53,280
50-249 +40 20% +2,260
250+ +15 14% -3,250
Non-Scottish owned
0-49 +180 1% +2,560
50-249 +165 80% +6,300
250+ +90 86% +21,670
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Performance by Sector
As previously highlighted in Chart 35, there is 
significant variation in sector performance in the 
most recent growth statistics for Scotland.
Within manufacturing, most sectors witnessed a 
decline, although food and drink grew by 1%.  
Construction continued to act as a drag on overall 
growth. Activity was down 3.5% over the quarter 
and 5.5% annually. (Chart 45)
The decline in construction has been driven by a 
sharp fall in infrastructure spending from record 
highs in 2015 (when a series of major public 
projects were being constructed). 
As highlighted above, the one bright spot has been 
the strength of the services sector  which grew 
+0.7% over the quarter and by 1.3% over the year.
With the exception of retail and accommodation 
& food, all major sectors grew over the year, 
with professional services making the greatest 
contribution. (Chart 46)
Such professional-and related services, including 
finance, real estate etc., have grown strongly 
in recent times  outpacing growth in the wider 
economy. (Chart 47)  
Retail sales were flat during the third quarter of 
2017 and grew just 0.6% over the year, providing 
further evidence of weak consumer confidence. 
(Chart 48)
Chart 45: Construction sector in Scotland since 2010 
Source: Scottish Government Q2 2017 Quarterly GDP 
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Chart 46: Contributions to service sector growth over last 12 
months
Source: Scottish Government Q2 2017 Quarterly GDP 
Chart 47: Strong growth in professional and related services 
since 2015
Source: Scottish Government, Q3 Retail Sales Index
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Chart 48: Weak retail sales growth  Q3 2017 
Source: Scottish Government Q2 2017 Quarterly GDP
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The Scottish labour market
The labour market in Scotland continues to provide 
impressive headline indicators  employment is 
75.2% whilst unemployment remains low at 4.0%. 
(Chart 49)
Over the year to September, employment 
has increased by 46,000. At the same time, 
unemployment has fallen by around 20,000.
On both, Scotland is slightly better than the UK  
although as we have indicated, with confidence 
intervals of +/1.3% & +/-0.7%-points surrounding 
these estimates, care needs to be taken when 
interpreting small differences in headline numbers. 
As Chart 50 shows, the recent growth in employment 
has been driven by rising self-employment. This is 
consistent with the trends on business formation 
outlined above.  
Regional variations continue across Scotland. 
Chart 51 shows relative performance by local 
authority between 2008 & 2013 (the peak of 
Scottish unemployment) and 2008 and 2017. 
Local authorities in the top right have been the 
most resilient, with higher employment in both 
2013 & 2017 compared to 2008. Authorities in 
the top left initially saw employment fall between 
2008 and 2013 but have since recovered. Those in 
the bottom left still have employment levels below 
2008 levels. 
Chart 49: Scottish employment & unemployment rate since 
2008  near record levels since LFS began in 1992
Source: ONS, LFS
Chart 50: Scottish employment & self-employment since 2011
Source: ONS, LFS
Chart 51: Local authority employment changes since 2008 
Source: ONS, APS
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Chart 52 shows the evolution of youth employment 
and unemployment. Youth unemployment in 
Scotland is around its record low but the youth 
employment rate remains below its 2007-08 level. 
The latest figures on earnings  which cover the 
period up to March 2017  show that household 
budgets continue to be squeezed. (Chart 53)
With inflation at 3%, real earnings have once again 
turned negative, meaning that workers are seeing 
the purchasing power of their pay eroded. 
As Chart 54 shows, earnings growth has not been 
uniform across incomes. While the fastest income 
growth has been seen among the 10% of the 
labour force with the lowest weekly earnings, this 
earnings growth is still barely above the rate of 
inflation. For all but the bottom 10%, real earnings 
have declined.
Productivity
Strong labour market outcomes are clearly 
welcome. Whilst there are concerns about the 
quality and nature of some of the work created, the 
overall trend has  on the whole  been positive.
That being said, this is only one dimension of the 
wider health of the economy.
With relatively weak economic growth, more people 
in work implies that the average contribution of 
each person to national output is either growing 
very slowly or falling. 
Much has been written recently about the UKs 
(and by implication Scotlands) productivity 
performance. In the long run it is key to boosting 
earnings and growing the tax base.
The latest figures show that productivity in 
Scotland as measured by output per hour (the 
preferred measure) was down 2.2% over the year.
Productivity growth has now been negative for 
seven consecutive quarters. (Chart 55)
As with Scottish GDP data, one reason for this is 
the downturn in oil and gas spilling over onto the 
onshore economy. 
Chart 52: Youth (16 -24) employment and unemployment since 
2007-08
Source: ONS, LFS
Chart 53: Median real earnings in Scotland and UK CPI inflation 
since 2003
Source: ONS, ASHE
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Chart 54: Nominal earnings growth median, mean and by decile, 
Scotland, 2016-2017 
Source: ONS, ASHE
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This is a concern as many of the sectors in the North 
Sea supply chain  e.g. in advanced engineering  
are highly productive.
Scotland had been catching up with the UK (until 
2015). (Chart 56)
Much of this catch-up appears to have not come 
from strong Scottish-specific productivity per se 
but because the UK has created jobs at a much 
faster rate and hence softening productivity 
growth. Why does this have an impact on 
productivity measures? 
Productivity is the ratio of output to labour input. If 
the number of people working is increasing faster 
than the growth in output (either due to population 
growth or higher participation), the contribution 
of each worker (or hour worked) will fall. Hence, a 
country creating fewer jobs, could see its relative 
productivity improve.
Chart 57 shows productivity on the basis that 
Scotland had matched the growth in UK jobs and 
hours worked since 2007  and compares this to 
the actual output per job/per hour Scottish series.
As can be seen, had Scotland matched UK growth 
in jobs (Scottish OPJ (UK)) or hours worked 
(Scottish OPH (UK))  for the same level of output 
growth, Scottish productivity would have been 
much weaker. 
Therefore, whether or not the form of catching-up 
that we have seen with UK productivity is a good 
thing is open to debate. 
At least in the short-run, there can sometimes be a 
trade-off between greater productivity and better 
labour market outcomes (i.e. more jobs). 
However you choose to view it, one thing that is 
clear is the importance of looking beyond the 
headline employment indicators to think about 
wider labour market issues like productivity, 
earnings and job quality.
Chart 55: Scottish productivity performance (output per hour) 
since 2015
Source: Scottish Government Productivity Statistics 
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Chart 56: Scottish vs. UK productivity (output per hour & output 
per job): 1998 to 2015
Source: FAI calculations 
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Chart 57: Scottish productivity growth under alternative growth 
scenarios for hours and jobs
Source: Scottish Government Productivity Statistics 
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Current economic conditions
The emerging economic data over the autumn has 
been  in the main  relatively positive. 
The FAI-RBS Business Monitor for Q3 2017 showed 
a slight increase in the net balance of firms 
reporting new business but a slight easing (albeit 
still positive) in repeat business. (Chart 58) 
The gap between the Scottish Purchasing 
Managers Index (PMI) and the equivalent for the 
UK had been narrowing a little in recent months. 
But Novembers PMI for Scotland fell to just 50.2 - 
the lowest value since March. (Chart 59).  
As highlighted previously in Chart 42, low levels 
of business investment has been an unwelcome 
feature of recent times and shows little sign of 
changing. 
The latest Scottish Business Monitor reports that 
more businesses are planning on cutting back 
investment over the next six months than there are 
planning to increase it. And this is despite turnover 
prospects improving. (Chart 60).
A similar result is found in the latest Scottish 
Chambers of Commerce survey. (Chart 61). Here 
the percentage of firms engaging in investment 
has tended to have been lower in both 2017 and 
2016 than in 2015. Unsurprisingly, the tourism 
sector  on the back of a strong 2016 and 2017 is 
more positive.
Chart 58: Scottish Business Monitor Q3 2017  fragile but still 
positive growth
Source: Fraser of Allander/RBS Scottish Business Monitor
Chart 59: PMI for different parts of the UK: Scotland lagging the 
UK 
Source: IHS Markit 
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Chart 60: Business investment intentions (and turnover) 
according to latest Scottish Business Monitor
Source: Fraser of Allander/RBS Scottish Business Monitor 
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Chart 61: Business investment intentions according to Scottish 
Chambers of Commerce*
Source: Scottish Chambers of Commerce/FAI 
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Levels of consumer confidence remain weak. The 
GfK consumer confidence indicator for Scotland 
declined further in November to its lowest level in 
2 years  and is now well below the UK (Chart 62). 
A similar story emerges in the Scottish 
Governments consumer sentiment measure. 
In this, Scottish households are asked of their 
expectations for the next 12 months for both 
the economy and household finances. Their 
expectations for the economy remain negative 
 and are at their lowest since the series began
in 2013. Their perception of the outlook for 
household finances has also weakened. (Chart 
63)
Overall, households at the lower end of the income 
distribution appear to be less confident about 
the future than better off households. The GfK 
indicator of consumer confidence has typically 
been more negative for those earning less than 
£25,000 for the past two years. (Chart 64)
Whilst households appear pessimistic about the 
outlook, the demand for labour remains strong. 
(Chart 65) The Bank of Scotlands labour market 
barometer  which captures various measures 
of activity in the Scottish jobs market such as 
demand for new staff etc.  continues to perform 
well-above its long-term average. 
This suggests that the disconnect between a 
resilient labour market and a weaker economic 
outlook is likely to continue for some time yet.
Chart 62: Consumer confidence in Scotland   becoming more 
negative 
Source: GfK
Chart 63: Scottish Government indicator of household 
sentiment on economy/household finances also declining 
Source: Scottish Government
Chart 64: Confidence negative across income bands pessimism 
highest amongst low earners
Source: GfK
Chart 65: Bank of Scotland employment indicator  continues to 
show robust labour market demand
Source: IHS Markit/Bank of Scotland
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As in the past, we report a central forecast but also 
uncertainty bands that set out a likely range within 
which we predict Scottish economic growth will lie. 
This December issue includes our first estimates of 
growth for 2020. 
We have revised down slightly our forecasts for 
2018 and 2019 in the light of a weaker UK outlook 
and a failure of investment or consumer confidence 
to pick-up in Scotland. 
However, our overall assessment is broadly 
unchanged. We believe that the Scottish economy 
will grow next year and the year after, but predict 
that such growth will remain below trend. 
Our revised forecast is for growth of 1.2% in 2018, 
1.4% in 2019 and 1.4% in 2020. (Table 8, Chart 66)
Our last forecast for 2017 of 1.2% growth  made 
in September  is on track to be slightly over 
optimistic based upon the latest figures published 
for this year thus far. 
Our nowcasts suggests growth of around 0.38% 
and 0.35% for Q3 and Q4 in 2017 (Table 9). 
The combination of these nowcasts alongside the 
revision to Q1 data (from 0.8% to 0.6%) and the 
weak growth of 0.1% in Q2, means that annual 
growth for 2017 is currently heading to be 0.8% on 
a 4Q-on-4Q basis (and 1.4% comparing the final 
quarter of 2017 with the same period in 2016). 
Should this occur, this will take Scotlands 
average growth rate over the past decade to just 
0.7%. It cannot be overemphasised how deeply 
disappointing this is. The fact that this poor 
performance is not the focus of more attention 
remains hugely surprising. 
The scale of our revisions for 2018 and 2019 are 
-0.16 and -0.30 percentage points respectively
(Table 10).
As in recent years, services should make the 
greatest contribution to overall growth, however in 
absolute terms, growth in production is forecast to 
be slightly higher. (Chart 67)
Table 8: FAI forecast Scottish Economic growth (%) 2018 to 
2020
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Table 9: Nowcasts for Q3 2017 and Q4 2017 for Scotland
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 66: Growth to remain below trend through forecast
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Table 10: FAI revised forecast %-point change from September 
2017 forecast by sector, 2018 to 2019
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
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Forecasts
2018 2019 2020
GVA 1.2 1.4 1.4
Production 1.4 1.6 1.2
Construction 0.7 0.9 0.5
Services 1.2 1.4 1.5
Q3 Q4
Quarterly Growth +0.38 +0.35
Annualised Growth +1.51 +1.4
2018 2019
GVA -0.16 -0.30
Production -0.11 -0.25
Construction -0.11 -0.21
Services -0.16 -0.31
* Actual data to Q2 2017, central forecast with forecast uncertainty for 
2018  2020. Uncertainty bands sourced from accuracy of past forecasts 
at different forecast horizons
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Weak earnings will mean that household spending 
 and the industries it supports (e.g. retail)  will
continue to be under pressure well into 2018. 
However building on recent growth, professional 
and business services are placed to do better. 
Tourist facing businesses have had a strong 2017 
and this should continue (particularly if Sterling 
stays competitive). 
We expect the outlook for manufacturing to be 
slightly more positive, particularly as optimism in 
the North Sea supply chain continues to improve.
The construction sector should start to see more 
positive growth over the next couple of years. 
The increase in investment announced by the UK 
Government should help reverse recent falls in 
infrastructure spending. 
The greatest drag on growth is likely to be weak 
business investment as Brexit uncertainty 
continues to put-off firms from expanding. 
Our latest forecasts for Scotland put us slightly 
behind the Bank of Englands forecast for the UK 
economy but ahead of the OBRs UK forecast. 
Whilst we do not forecast the UK economy directly, 
on balance, we believe that Scotland will do well 
to match forecasted UK growth over the next few 
years. (Table 11)
There are a number of reasons for this. 
Firstly, the downturn in oil and gas is clearly a 
structural rather than cyclical challenge. Going 
forward investment, wages and supply-chain 
activity will undoubtedly be smaller than in the 
past. 
Secondly, Scotlands 16-64 population is 
projected to grow more slowly (and then decline). 
This is in contrast to the UK as a whole. (Chart 68) 
Note however, to the extent that the pension age 
continues to rise, this will initially dampen any 
effect of population ageing in Scotland. 
Thirdly, there is little evidence to suggest that 
Scotland will significantly outperform the UK in 
terms of productivity over the next few years. 
Table 11: Forecast UK GDP growth (%) 2018 to 2020 
Source: HM Treasury
Chart 67: Sector components of FAI growth forecasts for 2018 to 
2020
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 68: Projections for working age population: Scotland vs. 
UK (different scenarios for pension age)
Source: ONS population projections
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
2017 2018 2019 2020
%
 c
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 t
o
 G
D
P
 g
ro
w
th
Households Government Investment Trade (RUK) Trade (ROW) GDP growth, %
2018 2019 2020
Bank of England 1.6 1.7 1.7
OBR 1.4 1.3 1.3
NIESR 1.7 1.7 1.6
European Commission 1.3 1.1 n/a
IMF 1.5 1.6 1.7
ITEM Club 1.4 1.3 n/a
29Economic Commentary, December 2017
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
A
n
n
u
a
l 
%
 c
h
a
n
g
e
Scotland UK
Indeed given recent trends, and the downturn in 
one of Scotlands most productive sectors  the oil 
and gas supply chain  the outlook for Scotland 
could be weaker.  
Clearly there remains much uncertainty over such 
forecasts, but our expectation is that productivity 
will start to pick-up in the coming years (albeit it will 
continue to remain poor by historical standards).  
Chart 69 shows alternative productivity forecasts 
under two different scenarios. A low scenario 
assumes that productivity performs broadly as it 
has done since 2008. The high scenario assumes 
that productivity returns to 2% growth by 2020.  
In the low productivity case, growth remains 
weak and stuck below 1% over the forecast horizon 
 growing just 0.5% in 2018 and 0.9% in 2019 and
2020. In the high productivity scenario, whilst 
growth remains below trend it starts to pick-up and 
approaches 2.1% by 2020. (Chart 70)
Faced with this outlook, and a decade of growth 
less than 1% a year, it is vital that the Scottish 
Government use the Budget to come forward with 
clear practical policy actions to support business, 
attract investment and boost productivity. 
Strategies, action plans and ambitions around 
inclusive growth will only take us so far. 
The Scottish Fiscal Commission (SFC) will publish 
its first economic and fiscal forecasts alongside 
the Scottish Budget. A number of points are worth 
noting. 
Based on recent evidence we see no reason to 
think that they will be anything but cautious in 
their assessment of the Scottish economy.  
Furthermore, weak GDP forecasts will undoubtedly 
have an impact on expected Scottish revenues 
(prior to any policy decisions). 
But as David Eisers article in this Commentary 
points out, changes in aggregate measures of 
economic performance (such as GDP), at least in 
the short-run, might not be perfectly correlated 
with changes in tax revenues.
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
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Chart 69: Forecasts for productivity growth: different scenarios
Chart 70: Growth forecasts under different outlooks for 
productivity (central, high productivity, low productivity)
Chart 71: Annual earnings growth: Scotland vs. the UK since 
2003
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For example for income tax, what matters most is 
the outlook for wages and employment. 
And here there are reasons to be slightly more 
optimistic on Scotlands relative performance (at 
least in the short-term). 
On earnings, whilst weak Scottish incomes have 
tended to keep pace with those in the UK as a 
whole.  (Chart 71). A similar picture emerges in 
terms of labour market indicators. Our latest 
forecast is for Scottish unemployment to broadly 
track that of the UK. (Table 12)
Of course, should Scotlands economy grow more 
slowly than the UK over time, then the potential 
risks to devolved budgets are more serious. Even 
small percentage point differences in tax revenues 
amount to hundreds of millions of pounds in lost 
revenues, even over a short number of years. 
This is why we believe that this Budget should be 
judged for what it says about the economy just as 
much as it will about Scottish taxation and spend. 
Table 12: FAI labour market forecast to 2020 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
2018 2019 2020
Employee jobs 2,462,900 2,488,850 2,526,500
% employee job 
growth over year
+0.9% +1.1% +1.5%
ILO unemployment 120,350 114,650 116,300
Bank of England - UK 4.3% 4.4% 4.6%
OBR - UK 4.2% 4.2% 4.3%
Rate (%)1 4.5 4.2 4.2
Notes: 
Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50. 
1. Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16 and over.
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Policy Context
The Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Derek Mackay, 
will publish the Scottish Budget on 14th December. 
As we set out in our Scotlands Budget: 2017 report 
in September, this will be a tough settlement. 
After a small increase in 2017/18, the Scottish 
resource block grant will fall by just under 1% in 
real terms next year. This will bring the cumulative 
real terms fall in the block grant since 2010/11 to 
almost 7%.
At the same time, the budget comes at a time 
of heightened economic uncertainty and weak 
growth. 
Meeting spending demands whilst maintaining 
economic competitiveness requires a careful 
balance.  
It is also worth remembering that Mr Mackay is 
required to gain the support of one or more party 
in the Scottish Parliament. 
So what are the key policy issues to look for?
The governments spending priorities
Since 1999, successive administrations have 
chosen to prioritise health spending. In this 
parliamentary term, the Scottish Government has 
committed to increase spending on health by £500 
million more than inflation. 
This might sound generous but it is likely to be 
sufficient just to keep up with population and 
demographic trends.
The government hopes that savings can be made 
by moving to more preventative and joined-up 
models of service provision - for example, in 
health and social care. But wider reforms continue 
to prove difficult to implement and, even then, will 
only deliver savings in the long-term. 
With health protected, other areas of the budget 
are required to pick-up the burden. 
Non-health spending has declined by 10% in real 
terms since 2010/11. But the population has also 
been growing. As a result, in per capita terms, 
non-health spending has declined by 13%, and is 
on course to fall by almost a fifth by the end of the 
decade.
A consequence of the increasing prevalence of 
one-year (as opposed to multi-year) budgets is 
that the scale of these changes over time  and 
the relative shift of spending priorities  has gone 
relatively unnoticed.
In looking to this weeks budget and beyond, there 
are some additional areas that are also likely to be 
protected. 
This includes commitments to protect police 
spending, expand childcare, and tackle 
inequalities in educational attainment. On top of 
this, the government has a number of politically 
symbolic policies to deliver (like free prescriptions, 
free university tuition, concessionary travel etc.); 
a pay rise for public sector workers; borrowing 
commitments (of around £1 billion); and a new 
social security agency to establish. 
Non-protected areas are therefore in line for a 
challenging budget settlement. 
Protecting some services over others is part of 
the job of government, but there is also a need for 
strategic choices within unprotected areas. 
Tax increases cannot free policymakers 
IURPPDNLQJGLőFXOWFKRLFHV
The pressures on spending means that the 
government has been quite open about its 
aspirations to raise revenues through income tax.
The government has advocated the concept of a 
social contract, i.e. access to a range of publicly 
provided services, including various flagship 
universal services, funded by higher taxation. 
But a policy to increase tax rates clearly carries 
risks, both politically and economically. 
Even a relatively bold policy on income tax (e.g. 
one that adds a penny to all tax rates but protects 
those earning below the national median income) 
is likely to raise not much more than £300 million. 
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This could help to offset this years budget cut. 
However, with consolidation of funding from 
Westminster likely to continue into the next 
decade, it will only be a short-term fix. 
Of course any proposals to increase tax rates will 
generate a debate about the potential effects on 
incentives to work, business competitiveness and 
Scotlands attractiveness as a place for investment. 
In reality, little is known with certainty about the 
potential economic impacts of changing tax rates 
within the context of devolution. In the short 
run, much will depend upon the aggregate net 
impact of reduced household incomes but higher 
government spending.  
But over the long run, of greater concern to the 
government could be the impact of higher taxes 
on business sentiment and Scotlands perceived 
competiveness relative to the rest of the UK. 
If there is one area where the government may be 
more likely to consider tax cuts, it is in relation 
to Land and Buildings Transaction Tax. There had 
been calls to align LBTT rates closer to those in 
England (properties in Scotland pay higher tax 
on transactions over £333,000). It may also face 
pressure to mimic the UK Governments Stamp 
Duty tax cut for first time buyers. 
The risk is that, with the price structure of housing 
significantly different in Scotland compared to 
England, replicating the English structure will 
imply much reduced revenues and would  impose 
a system of rates less relevant to the Scottish 
market. In the longer term, most economists would 
argue that a more fundamental restructuring of 
land and property taxation, encompassing not 
just LBTT but also business rates and council tax, 
makes more sense. 
Ironically the delay to the devolution of Air 
Passenger Duty (scheduled for 2018) may alleviate 
some immediate budget pressures, given the 
Scottish Governments commitment to reduce 
rates.
The importance of growth
The economic backdrop to the Budget will be 
shaped by the first ever forecasts from the Scottish 
Fiscal Commission (SFC) for both the Scottish 
economy and devolved revenues. It is likely that 
the SFC will be downbeat about the immediate 
prospects for both. 
The fragile economy is of course a significant issue 
for the public finances.  A faster growing economy 
generates larger revenues, while a weaker one 
generates less. 
But whilst it is harder in practice for government 
to stimulate the economy than is often supposed, 
both the Scottish and UK governments are certainly 
not powerless to support growth over the medium 
term. 
With disappointing economic data for two years 
now, the Scottish Government will need to 
articulate how it will support the economy. So 
where can the budget make a difference?
Taxation: One area that businesses will look for 
clarity is over the governments long term vision 
for taxation. If taxes rise, businesses will demand 
a convincing equivalent to the social contract: 
i.e. demonstrable improvements in skills, digital 
connectivity and infrastructure. Action plans and 
strategies will not be sufficient.
Spending priorities: The First Minister has said 
that the government is willing to look at how to 
make the most of the money we already spend 
on supporting the economy  around £2bn per 
annum. That is a significant amount of money  
but does it have an equivalent impact? Enhancing 
the quality of further and higher education, 
supporting enterprise and skills, boosting R&D 
and innovation, delivering a workable National 
Investment Bank are just some of the areas where 
concrete action could make a difference.
Capital investment and borrowing: As a result of UK 
Government decisions, the Scottish Governments 
capital budget is to increase over the next few 
years. Combined with new borrowing powers, 
investment could return to levels not seen since 
2010/11. In the current economic climate, there 
is a case for utilising the borrowing powers in full, 
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but where and how effectively the money is spent 
is just as important.
Financial Transactions: At the same time, 
the government now has £1bn of Financial 
Transactions at its disposal. In theory these could 
be used to lend to businesses  on generous 
terms  to support investment in anything from 
commercial property to R&D. Many would argue 
that investment in these sorts of projects has the 
potential to generate a greater economic return 
than if it were simply used to support borrowing 
for the residential property market. 
The importance of a longer term 
perspective
The major budgetary and wider policy challenges 
that Scotland faces cannot be addressed on 
a year-by-year basis. Implicitly policymakers 
recognise this.
They are increasingly adopting longer-term targets 
for policy interventions (the latest is the target to 
eliminate child poverty by 2030, now enshrined in 
the Child Poverty (Scotland) Bill).
But despite this recognition of the importance of 
a longer-term vision, budget planning remains 
remarkably short-sighted. Unfortunately, another 
one year budget is likely - at best a two year budget 
- following single year budgets in 2016/17 and
2017/18.
The short-term perspective means we lose sight 
both of where we are coming from, but also how 
long-term challenges can best be addressed.
Part of this reflects the political reality of a minority 
government. But this cannot be used as an excuse 
to avoid taking a more strategic approach to the 
Budget. 
Conclusions
In September we discussed how the Scottish 
Government had set out a new vision for supporting 
growth and its willingness to change the emphasis 
of its approach to economic policy. 
The Budget offers the first test of the level of the 
governments ambition.
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